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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
APPEALS FROM PARTS OF JUDGMENTS
IN MONTANA
The authorities and statutes herein considered are those
relating to this question: When may an appeal be taken to
the Supreme Court from a part only of a District Court judg-
ment? To lawyer and layman alike the problem is one of con-
siderable interest. The lawyer is concerned not only with the
economic side, but also with the legal need for laws which
are reasonably definite and certain; on the other hand the
layman is primarily concerned with the cost of his litigation
and his right to have it conducted with the least possible ex-
pense.
It is to be noted, that at common law a writ of error had
the effect of bringing up before the reviewing court, for ex-
amination of errors of law, the entire record. Consequently
it would not lie to review a part only of a judgment.' In equity
cases the rules of the high court of chancery in England per-
mitted appeals from parts of judgments, but in so doing the
party appealing admitted the correctness of other parts of
the judgment
The prevailing rule in this country is, that the right of ap-
peal is statutory' and that an appeal cannot be taken from. a
part only of a final judgment, unless there is a statute per-
mitting it, or unless such part from which the appeal is taken,
is not connected with, or dependent upon, the remaining por-
tion.!
During the existence of Montana Territory, the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Montana was regulated
by territorial laws, consistent with the constitution of the
United States and the Organic Act.! Following the adoption
of the Constitution and the admission of Montana as a state,
in 1899, judgments in the District Courts could be appealed
from to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, only un-
12 R. C. L. Appeal and Error §12.
The pertinent portion of the common law writ of error recited:
We . . . do command you, that, if judgment thereof be given, then un-
der your seal you do distinctly and openly send the record and pro-
cess of the complaint aforesaid with all things concerning them, and
this writ .
BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENoLAND Book III (4th
ed. 1770) Ch. 25 p. 405, and appendix IIi, §6.
22 DANL; CH. PR. p. 1547.
34 C. J. S. Appeal and Error. §7.
'C. J. S. Appeal and Error §109, 2 AM. JuR., APPEAL AND ERROR §20.
Appeal and Error, 3 C. J. p. 466..
'Barkley v. Logan (1875) 2 Mont. 296; Plaisted v. Nowlan (1876) 2
Mont. 359.
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der the limitations and regulations as to time, manner and
mode provided by statute, enacted in accordance with con-
stitutional provisions.'
The Statutes:
The statutes involved provide:
(a) "An appeal may be taken to the supreme court from
a district court in the following cases: ...From a final judg-
ment entered in an action or special proceeding commenced in
a district court, or brought into a district court from another
court . . ." This is Section 9731, R. C. M. 1935, and it is in
substantially the same form as when it was first enacted in
1864. It was amended in 1877, by adding the words, "or any
part thereof" after the word "judgment". Such words added
by such amendment were deleted upon the inclusion of the
section in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1895; it has remained
unchanged since.! The amendment was probably brought about
through the harshness of the rule announced in the cases decided
by the Supreme Court in 1875 and 1876.'
(b) "An appeal may be taken ... From a final judgment
in an aetion or special proceeding commenced in the court in
which the same is rendered within six months after the entry of
such judgment . . ." This is Section 9732, R. C. M., 1935, and
it is in substantially the same form as when it was first enacted
in 1864.'
(c) "An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the
'MONT. CONST; Art VIII. §§2, 3, 15; R. C. M. 1935 §9729; Finlen v.
Heinze (1902) 27 Mont. 107; 79 P. 829; 70 P. 617; Pierson v. Daly
(1914) 49 Mont. 478; 143 P. 957.
4 C. J. S. Appeal and Error §18.
'History: First appeared in Ch. II, §262, p. 95, LAWS OF MONTANA,
1864-5; unchanged in Ch. II, §331, P. 221, LAWS OF MONTANA 1867;
re-enacted §830, p. 110, Cod. Stat. 1871; amended by adding
words, "or any part thereof" after word "judgment" Ch. 2, §431, p.
157, LAWS OF MONTANA, 1877 re-enacted §431 (1st Div.) Rev. Stat.
1879; §444, (1st Div.) Comp. Stat. 1887; words, "or any part thereof,"
deleted, on adoption of §1722, Code. of Civ. Proc. 1895; re-enacted
§7096, Rev. Codes, 1907; amended Ch. 225, §10, LAWS OF MONTANA,
1921; re-enacted R. C. M. 1921, §9731; R. C. M. 1935, §9731.
'Barkley v. Logan (1875) 2 Mont. 296; Plaisted v. Nowlan (1875) 2
Mont. 359.
'History: First appeared in Ch. 1, §251, p. 95, LAWS OF MONTANA,
1864-5; changed as to time for appeal in Ch. I, §320, p. 199, LAWS OF
MONTANA, 1867; re-enacted as §369, (p. 107) Cod. St. 1871; changed
as to time for appeal, certain cases, Ch. I, §408, p. 150, LAWS OF MON-
TANA, 1877; re-enacted §408, (1st. Div.) Rev. Stat. 1879; §421 (1st.
Div.) Comp. Stat. 1887; §1723, Code of Civ. Proc. 1895; §7099, Rev.
Codes, 1907; amended as to time for appeal, Ch.. 225, §11, LAWS OF
MONTANA, 1921; re-enacted R. C. M. 1921, §9732; amended as to time
for appeal, Ch. 39 §1, LAWS OF MONTANA, 1925; re-enacted as R. C. M.
1935, §9732.
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court in which the judgment ... appealed from is entered, a
notice stating the appeal from the same, or some specific part
thereof, and serving a similar notice on the adverse party, or
his attorney . . ." This is Section 9733, R. C. M., 1935, and it
is in the same form as when it was adopted in 1864°
Consideration of Said Statutes and Decisions:
The Statutes and decisions will be considered in three
groups. Group I. Period to the amendment of what is now
R. C. M. 1935, Section 9731, in 1877. Group II. Period during
the life of such amendment, 1877 to 1895. Group III. Period
since 1895 to the present time.
GROUP I.
The first decision was that of Barkley v. Logan.'
The suit was one for an injunction. The appellant being
satisfied with the greater portion of the decree, appealed from
that part thereof awarding priority to Cedar Gulch Ditch over
the South Bowman Ditch. The court dismissed the appeal,
holding Sections 369 (p. 107) and 380 (p. 110), Codified Stat-
utes, 1871, (R. C. M. 1935, Sections 9732 and 9731) "defined
the appellate jurisdiction", and that the whole judgment must
be appealed from in order to give the court jurisdiction over a
part; that it had no jurisdiction over an appeal from part of
a judgment. Though Section 370 (p. 107), Codified Statutes,
1871 (R. C. M. 1935, Section 9733) contained the words, "or
some specific part thereof", the court held it did not "enlarge"
the "jurisdiction" conferred by the two first mentioned sec-
tions, which must control.
The second decision was that of Plaisted v. Nowlan."
No facts are stated in the opinion. A motion for rehearing
of the case of Barkley v. Logan was also argued and submitted.
The opinion declares, "It is claimed by the respondent and ad-
mitted by the appellant that this is an appeal from a certain
"History: First appeared as Ch. 1, §252, p. 95 LAWS OF MONTANA, 1864-
5; re-enacted, without change, Ch. I, §321, p. 199, LAWS OF MONTANA,
1867; §370, p. 107, Cod. Stat. 1871; Ch. I, §409, p. 150, LAWS OF MoN-
tana, 1877; §409 (1st Div.) Rev. Stat. 1879; §422 (1st. Dlv.) Comp.
Stat. 1887; §1724, Code. Civ. Proc. 1895; §7100, Rev. Codes, 1907;
R. C. M. 1921, §9735; R. C. M. 1935 §9733.
n(1875) 2 Mont. 296.
"A view contrary to the Montana cases prevails In California, South
Dakota and New York. Hayne on New Trial & App. §185; Male v.
Harlan, 12 S. D. 627, 82 N. W. 179; Van Loan v. Squires, 51 Hun. 360,
4 N. Y. S. 371." Cottler v. Sullivan (1934) 47 Wyo. 72, 31 P. (2d) 675.
"(1876) 2 Mont. 39.
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part of a decree, and that the respondent relies upon the
authority of Barkley v. Logan, ante 291 to sustain his position."
The court adhered to its decision in the last cited case, dismissed
the motion for rehearing thereof, and sustained the motion to
dismiss the appeal in the instant cause.
GROUP II.
The third decision was that of Largey v. Sedman." Sed-
man appealed from a decree of foreclosure authorizing the sale
of real estate in which he claimed an interest. Two of the de-
fendants defaulted, and the decree was rendered upon issue
joined by Sedman. The appeal was from the whole of the judg-
men for costs and the whole of the judgment affecting Sed-
man's interest in said property. Respondent moved to dismiss
the appeal, as being from a part of a judgment only.
The court held:
"The only issue tried in the case had relation to his
interest in the property . . His appeal is therefore equiva-
lent to, and is an appeal from the whole judgment and de-
cree, and does not come within the principle laid down in
Barkley v. Logan and Plaisted v. Nowlan."
No mention was made in the opinion of the amendment
made to Section 380, Codified Statutes, 1871, by the incorpora-
tion of the words "or any part thereof", after the word "judg-
ment" in Section 431, LAWS OF MONTANA 1877.
The fourth decision was that of In re Davis' Estate."' An
appeal was taken from a single order denying two motions for
change of venue. One motion was on the ground of prejudice
of the judge, the other was on the ground of prejudice of the
inhabitants of the county. Two notices of appeal were filed.
The body of one notice of appeal recited that appellants ap-
pealed from the order of the court overruling the motion for a
change of venue on account of the prejudice of the judge; the
other notice recited an appeal from the order of the court over-
ruling a motion for a change of venue on account of the preju-
dice of the inhabitants of the county. Although each appeal
appears to have been from the whole order, the court treated
each as being from a portion thereof.
"(1880) 3 Mont. 472.
For same results reached on different rationale see Everding & Far-
rell v. Toft (1915) 92 Ore. 1; 150 P. 757; McDonald v. White (1907)
46 Wash. 334, 89 P. 891.
"4(1891) 11 Mont. 1, 27 P. 342.
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The court said:
"The court below could not abridge our right of ap-
peal on both motions by refusing to decide them separately,
and by entering but one order. The cases of Barkley v.
Logan, 2 Mont. 296 and Plaisted v. Nowlan, 2 Mont. 359
on which respondent relies are easily distinguished. When
they were decided, the statute relating to appeals was sub-
sequently amended and now reads: 'An appeal may be
taken to the Supreme Court . . . First, From a final judg-
ment, or any part thereof, entered in an action. .. ' " (Code
Civ. Proc. Section 444)
Though it was an appeal from a probate order, the case
is cited in Bank of Commerce, etc., v. Fuqua, et al., infra as
an authority for an appeal from part of a judgment.
The fifth decision was that of Bank of Commerce, etc., v.
Fuqua, et al.' The action was upon a bill of exchange. The
appellant was one of the acceptors and endorsers on the bill.
The entire judgment was for $4,000.00, principal amount and
$400.00 attorney's fees. The appellant appealed from the por-
tion thereof relating to attorney's fees. Respondent moved to
dismiss the appeal because it was from part of a judgment only.
The court held:
"Respondent contends that an appeal from part of a
judgment is not proper practice, and cites . . . Barkley v
Logan, 2 Mont. 296 . . . and . . . Plaisted v. Nowlan, 2
Mont. 359 . . . These cases would support respondent 's
position but for the fact that ... the statute under which
they were determined has been amended so as to provide
for an appeal from the judgment 'or some part thereof'
... Sections 408 and 431 (10th Sess. Laws) . . . The statute
has since remained in that form. We therefore hold that an
appeal may be prosecuted from part of a judgment. (See
In re Davis' Estate, ante, p. 1)"
GROUP III
The sixth decision was that of In re Bitter Root Irri. Dist.
et al."° The case was an appeal by the District from an order
"(1891) 11 Mont. 285, 28 P. 291. In an Oregon case, the plaintiff by
judgment recovered the principal amount of a note, but was denied
recovery as to attorney's fees, though the note provided therefor. The
judgment was settled as to the principal amount and plaintiff ap-
pealed from the part of the judgment denying attorney's fees. The
court held that as the answer of the defendant denied the allegations
of the complaint the judgment was not "severable" and dismissed the
appeal. Bush v. Mitchell (1895) 28 Ore. 92, 41 P. 155.
"(1923) 67 Mont. 436, 218 P. 945.
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creating an irrigation district in which respondent Cooney's
lands were sought to be embraced. The respondent moved to
dismiss the appeal because it was from a portion of the judg-
ment, instead of from the whole thereof. The court affirmed
the judgment of the district court, thereby denying said mo-
tion, declaring the rule announced in Barkley v. Logan1' and
Plaisted v. Nowlan was inapplicable.
The court held that:
.. . the instant case comes within the rule of Largey v.
Sedman. The only contest here was between the petitioners
and the objector ... Cooney ... In all essential particulars
it was the same as though it was an independent proceeding
between the petitioners and the objector, and therefore ap-
pears to us that the appeal is equivalent to, and is, an appeal
from the whole judgment so far as those parties are con-
cerned."
The seventh decision was that of Lohman v. Poor et al.'
Two joint notes were executed by Tracy E. Poor, (who default-
ed) and Daniel H. Poor, in favor of X Company and Y Com-
pany, and as security for the payment of these notes separate
mortgages were executed on their respective lands. The X
Company assigned their note and mortgages to Lohman who
brought foreclosure suit. Daniel H. Poor and wife, defended
claiming non-delivery of the note and mortgages to the X Com-
pany and also non-delivery of the note and mortgages to the
Y Company. The court adjudged that all of the notes and
mortgages had been delivered; ordered foreclosure of the Daniel
H. Poor mortgage to the X Company, subject nevertheless, to
the note and mortgages given to th Y Company, as to which
the court reserved the right to hear further evidence, permit
further pleadings, and make further judgments. Lohman ap-
pealed from the parts of the decree adjudging that the Y Com-
pany's note and mortgage had been delivered, and from those
ordering sale of said lands, subject to the amount due, if any,
upon the Y Company's note and mortgage. In applying the
rule announced in Barkley v. Logan' and Plaisted v. Nowlan"
the court held:
"The statute does not permit such an appeal to be taken
.. .Since the attempted appeal is not authorized by the
statute, it is dismissed."
"(1875) 2 Mont. 296.
"(1876) 2 Mont. 359.
"(1923) 68 Mont. 579; 220 P. 1094.
'*Supra note 17.
"Supra note 18.
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The eighth decision was that of Wills v. Morris, et al."
The action sought complete adjudication to the waters of Union
Creek. A decree was rendered adjudicating the rights of all
parties to such waters. Of the defendants, Morris and Bennett
appealed from the part of the decree awarding water rights to
plaintiff, and from the part thereof relating to the water awards
to appellants (describing). Respondent moved to dismiss such
appeal, because no appeal lies from part of a judgment.
The court held:
. . if two or more of the parties are awarded a water
right under the terms of the decree, each receiving such
award recovers a judgment against the other or others.
Such a judgment is divisible into parts. Accordingly, we
hold that where a judgment is divisible into parts, an appeal
will lie from a part of the judgment, and whatever is said in
the case of Lohman v. Poor, supra, to the contrary is over-
ruled. "
The court impliedly overruled its interpretation of Section
370 (p. 107) Codified Statutes, 1871, (R. C. M., 1935 Section
9733) announced in Barkley v. Logan and Plaisted v. Nowlan,
in which cases it was held this statutory provision did not relate
to jurisdiction. It held, the words, "or some specific part
thereof" of Section 9733, first appearing in the Statutes of
1887, were meaningless, unless an appeal could be taken from a
part of a judgment "in some circumstances".' Tlhe court re-
marked that the courts of California have construed "Section
"(1935) 100 Mont. 504; 50 P. (2d) 858. For a contrary holding see
In re Silvies River (District Court, D. Ore.) 199 F. 495, 503, Mr. Jus-
tice Bean, saying: "The water is the ... subject matter of the contro-
versy. It is to be divided among the several claimants .... The pro-
ceeding is essentially a suit for partition of the waters of the stream
. . . and is not a separable controversy between different claimants.
... Each claimant is directly and vitally interested, not only in estab-
lishing the validity and extent of his own claiip, but in having deter-
mined all of the other claims."
"The court cited Section 450 First Div. Comp. Statutes of 1887. This
Section was wholly inapplicable to the point under discussion in the
opinion, to which it was assigned. It relates only to appeals from
Probate Courts, being found in the statutes mentioned in a "Chapter
II," entitled "Appeals from Probate to District Courts." The provi-
sions corresponding to R. C. M. 1935, 1921, §9733, in such statutes, is
422, Chap. I, First Div. Title II, Comp. Statutes of 1887. The state-
ment in the court's opinion that the language "or some specific part
thereof" was no part of R. C. M. 1935, 1921, §9733, until it first ap-
peared in the Compiled Statutes of 1887 is not sustained by enact-
ments previous to the last mentioned statutes. Sections identical to
R. C. M. 1935, 1921, §9733, are found in, Ch. I, §252, LAWS OF MON-
TANA 1864-5, Ch. I, §321, LAWS OF MONTANA, 1867; §370 (p. 107) Cod.
St., 1871; Ch. I, (Title X) §409, LAWS OF MONTANA, 1877.
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940 of the California Code of Civil Procedure ... corresponding
to . .. Sec. 9733," so as to permit an appeal from part of a
judgment, where its provisions are severable."
Classification of Decisions, According to Holdings.
According to their holdings, the decisions reviewed fall
into three groups:
Firsts Those in which it was held that an appeal could not
be taken from a part of a judgment in any case.'
Seconds Those in which it was held:
(a) That an appeal could be taken from part of a judg-
ment, because of the existence of a statute authorizing it, (Ch.
2, TITLE X, Section 431, LAWS OF MONTANA, 1877.)"
(b) That an appeal could be taken from part of a judg-
ment, if the provisions thereof were divisible, pursuant to an
interpretation of the words, "or some specific part thereof", in
what is now R. C. M. 1935, Section 9733."
Third: Those in which it appeared that an appeal was taken
from a portion of the judgment therein rendered, which de-
termined an issue between some of the parties, and which issue
was distinct, entire and complete between such parties, being
the "whole judgment" insofar as such parties were concerned.
In such cases such appeals have been sustained by the Supreme
Court, as appeals from the whole of such judgments."
In concluding this review, it may be said, that in Montana,
at this time, under the deci.':on and statutes considered:
1. An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from
part of a judgment, providing the terms of the judgment are
divisible.
2. An appeal may not be taken to the Supreme Court,
from part of a judgment, if the terms of the judgment are not
divisible.
'California Code provisions, similar to ours are as follows:
§940, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. is similar to, R. C. M. 1935, §9733;
§963, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. is similar to, R. C. M. 1935, §9731;
§939, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. is similar to, R. C. M. 1935, §9732.
Attention was called to some California decisions allowing appeals
from parts of judgments, in the cases of In re Davis' Estate (1891)
11 Mont. 1; 27 P. 342, and Bank of Commerce, etc. v. Fuqua, et al.
(1891) 11 Mont. 285, 28 P. 291. Barkley v. Logan (1875) 2 Mont. 296.
"Barkley v. Logan (1875) 2 Mont. 296; Plaisted v. Nowlan (1876) 2
Mont. 359; Lohman v. Poor, et al. (1923) 68 Mont. 579, 220 P. 294.
"In re Davis' Estate (1891) 11 Mont. 1, 27 P. 342; Bank of Commerce,
etc. . Fuqua, et al. (1891) 11 Mont. 285, 28 P. 291.
'Wills v. Morris, et al (1935) 100 Mont. 504, 50 P. (2d) 858.
nLargey v. Sedman (1880) 3 Mont. 372; In re Bitter Root Irri. Dist.
(1923) 67 Mont. 436, 218 P. 945.
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3. An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from
an issue decided in a judgment, where such issue is distinct,
entire and complete between some of the parties to the action,
-the court in such case viewing such an appeal as one from the
whole judgment.
Regardless of whether the right to take an appeal from
part of a judgment is found in the statutes, ' or in the rule that
such an appeal is permissible, where the appeal is from part of
a judgment independent of, and in no way dependent upon
the remaining portions," it is the judgment that is to be sepa-
rated.'1 The part of the judgment from which the appeal is
taken, must be separable from the remaining portions, so that
the reviewing court may render a decision of affirmance, modi-
fication or reversal thereon, which will in no way effect or dis-
turb the unappealed part of such judgment, the subject thereof,
or the rights of the parties involved.' The separable issue de-
termined by a judgment cannot be broken down or split and an
appeal taken from one of the split portions or fragments.' The
appellate court must be able to render a decision on the part ap-
pealed from, without bringing up the entire judgment for re-
view.' The partial appeal does not give the appellate court jur-
isdiction of the portion of the judgment unappealed from.'
It would seem that some method could be devised to elim-
inate the hazards of determining whether a portion of a judg-
ment is divisible so as to be the subject of a separate appeal.
It might be possible by Supreme Court rule," or statute, to pro-
vide that a party could file his notice of appeal from the whole
judgment and then petition the appellate court for permission
to limit the appeal to a part only of the judgment. By this
'Wills v. Morris, et al., (1935) 100 Mont. 504, 50 P. (2d) 858; Kramer
v. Kramer, (1907) 75 Kan. 134, 90 P. 998, 91 P. 45; McDonald v. White(1907) 45 Wash. 334, 89 P. 891; Christ v. Johnstone (1913) 25 N. D.
6, 140 N. W. 678; Blaine Inv. Co. v. Guays (1932) 52 Idaho 381, 15 P.(2d) 734; 2 HAYNE NEW TRIAL AND APPEAL, (1912 ed.) §185, p. 971;
2SPELLING, NEW TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE, (1903 ed.) §493, p.
1030: 1 Cal. Jur. §25, p. 134.
"*St. Paul Tr. Co. v. Kittson (1901) 84 Minn. 493, 87 N. W. 1012; Everd-
ing & Farrell v. Toft (1915) 88 Ore. 1, 150 P. 757; Gleiser v. Mc-
Gregor (1892) 85 Iowa 489, 52 N. W. 366; Daniels v. Smith (1911)
252 Ill. 222, 96 N. E. 902; Belle Fourche Ry. Co. v. Belle Fourche Land.
etc., Co. (1911) 28 S.: D. 289, 133 N. W. 261.
"cottier v. Sullivan (1934) 47 Wyo. 72, 31 P. (2d) 675.
"Supra note 29 and 30.
'Cottier Case, Supra note 31.
"St. Paul Tr. Co. v. Kittson (1901) 64 Minn. 493, 87 N. W. 1012.
"Cottier Case, Supra note 31.
"See Johnson, Rulea of Court, 6 MONT. L. REv. 1 (Spring, 1945).
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method the appellant would be secure, and at the same time
would be enabled to avoid needless expense.'
Harry H. Jones.
'"At the present time, the R. C. M. 1935, §9746, as to abbreviated rec-
ords, provides:
"The appellant may present to the Supreme Court or any justice
thereof, a copy of the record from which are omitted those parts
thereof which appellant believes to be immaterial to any question
arising on the appeal, and thereupon, if it shall appear, prima facie,
that the parts omitted are so immaterial, the court or justice shall
make an order allowing such abbreviated record to be served and
filed as the transcript on appeal, and directing the clerk of the dis-
trict court to certify to such transcript, which order shall save to
the respondent the right to suggest a diminution of the record in case
he can show that without the parts omitted the appeal cannot be
fairly and fully heard and determined."
A similar procedure might be followed In dealing with appeals from
a part of a judgment, permitting appellant to prepare a record ap-
plicable to the portion of the judgment appealed from and submit It
to the Supreme Court, or any justice thereof, for an order allowing
it to be filed. Such abbreviation might avoid necessity of printing the
record or save expense of printing the entire record. See Supreme
Court Rules, Rule VI, Transcripts, page xxi, 101 Montana Reports.
INCORPORATION UNDER THE CIVIL CODE OF
MONTANA CHAPTER 42
Does R.C.M. 1935, Chapter 42 of the Civil Code, and es-
pecially Section 6455, permit the successful incorporation of an
organization, the activities of which will not extend beyond the
county wherein it is located, by filing its articles of incorpora-
tion with the clerk and recorder only of the county wherein
such organization is located?
An example of the type of association which it is contended
in this article should incorporate by filing with the county clerk
and recorder where located and also with the Secretary of State,
is a "flying club" organized for the purpose of owning planes
and teaching its members how to fly. Another is a "fire de-
partment relief association." The latter type is elsewhere re-
ferred to in this article.
A corporation is a creature of the law and can exist only
with the permission of the State,' and furthermore, the right
to engage in business can be exercised through the agency of a
corporation only by express permission of the State, and only
for such purposes as may be authorized
Section 6455, which is the section dealing with the forma-
'Boca Mill Company v. Curry (1908) 154 Col. 326, 97 P. 1117.
'Bank of California v. San Francisco (1904) 142 Col. 276, 75 P. 832.
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